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Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in
Arctic Sovereignty
Stephanie Holmes*

In August 2007, Russia garnered international attention by sending two
mini-submarines to plant a Russian flag in the deep seabed near the North Pole.'
The gesture symbolized Russia's interest in the Arctic,2 though many
commentators have dismissed the act as legally inconsequential.3 The journey is
believed to have been the first submarine mission to the North Pole seabed.4
During the excursion, scientists collected geological samples in the hopes of

1
2

3
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BS 2005, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2009, The University of Chicago. The author
would like to thank the CJIL staff and editorial board for their valuable comments and Professor
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Russia Plants Flag tinder N Pole, BBC News (Aug 2, 2007), available online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6927395.stm> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
See Russians to Dive below North Pole, BBC News (July 24, 2007), available online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6914178.stm> (visited Apr 5, 2008) ("The Arctic is ours
and we should demonstrate our presence[.]") (quoting Russian scientist and legislator Artur
Chilingarov).
In the United States and Canada, government officials were quick to publicly respond to the flag
planting. See, for example, Douglas Birch, Russian Subs Seek Glory at North Pole, AP (Aug 2, 2007),
available online at <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/environment/2007-08-02-articgrabN.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008) (quoting US State Department Spokesman Tom Casey, who
said he is "not sure whether they put a metal flag, a rubber flag, or a bedsheet on the ocean
floor.... Either way it doesn't have any legal standing" and Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Peter MacKay, claiming that because "this isn't the 15th century[, y]ou can't go around the world
and just plant flags and say We're claiming this territory."'). Legal commentators also responded
that the gesture was legally meaningless. See, for example, Mark Leon Goldberg, About that
Russian Arctic
"Claim," UN
Dispatch
(Aug 20,
2007),
available
online
at
<http://www.undispatch.com/ archives/2007/08/about -that- russ.php> (visited Apr 5, 2008)
("Flag planting has zero standing under international law. It is geology that dictates claims."). In
fact, by the early twentieth century, legal scholars had summarily dismissed the notion that
symbolic gestures could create property rights. See Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte,
Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in InternationalLaw, 29 Am J Intl L 448, 461
(1935) (stating that, by the early 1900s, contemporary theorists had deemed symbolic acts
"completely ineffectual').
Russia Plants Flag,BBC News (cited in note 1).
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finding further support for Russia's pending claim that a large portion of the
Arctic seabed is an extension of its continental shelf.'
Despite skepticism over the legal implications of Russia's mission,
surrounding nations were quick to respond. In mid-August 2007, Canadian
Prime Minister Stephen Harper toured the Arctic and reaffirmed a recent
commitment to expand Canada's military presence there.6 Around the same
time, Denmark launched a month-long expedition to the Arctic.7 Like Russia,
Denmark hopes to collect evidence that will support a claim that the continental
shelf of Greenland-a province of Denmark-extends to the North Pole.8 The
United States has been slower to react, but is considering building two new polar
icebreakers to traverse the Arctic.9 Norway, the remaining nation that borders
the Arctic, did not immediately respond to Russia's act, perhaps because it has
previously admitted that its continental shelf does not reach the North Pole.' °
However, Norway is the only other country (besides Russia) that has filed a legal
claim to extend its continental shelf into a portion of the Arctic Ocean."'
Drawing proper boundaries is important because, as the world grows
warmer, the Arctic Ocean, which is now frozen for more than half the year, will
become increasingly valuable in terms of natural resources, commerce, and
military activity. The relevant legal regime to handle territorial disputes in the

5
6

Id.
Rob Gillies, Competing Claims over Arctic Region, Wash Post (Aug 8, 2007), available online at
<hrtp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/08/AR2007080801
494.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008). In July 2007, Prime Minister Harper announced plans to build
eight new ships to patrol the Arctic, as well as a new Canadian port. Office of the Prime Minister,
Press Release, Prime Minister Stephen HarperAnnounces New Arctic Offshore PatrolShips (July 9, 2007),
available online at <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1742> (visited Apr 5, 2008).

7

Ben Leapman, Denmark Joins Race to Claim North Pole, Sunday Telegraph 029 (Aug 12, 2007).

8

Id. For an overview of Denmark's 2004 claim, see Barry Hart Dubner, On the Basisfor Creation of a
New Method of Defining InternationalJuisdictionin the Arctic Ocean, 13 Mo Envir L & Poly Rev 1, 1
(2005).

9

10

Russia to Sink Flag to Arctic Sea Floor in Oil, Land Grab, AP (Aug 1, 2007), available online at
<http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/08/01/arctic.grab.ap/index.html> (visited Apr
5, 2008).
See Jonas Gahr Store, The Law of the Sea and the High North, Speech to the Press Meeting (Aug 13,

11

2007), available online at <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/About-the-Ministry/Ministerof-Foreign-Affairs-Jonas-Gahr-S/Speeches-and-articles/2007/The-Law-of-the-Sea-and-the-HighNorth.html?id=479201> (visited Apr 5, 2008) ("According to the documentation, it is presumed
that the northernmost point on the Norwegian continental shelf is located at approximately 840
41' N, i.e., well south of the North Pole.").
See ContinentalShelf Submission of Norway in Respect ofAreas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea, and the
Norwegian Sea: Executive Summay (2006), available online at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
clcs-new/subrissions-files/nor06/nor-exec-sum.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008) ("Norway Executive
Summar).
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Arctic is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"). 12
However, the language of UNCLOS is ambiguous about how to decide the
overlapping claims that are likely to develop in the Arctic. Furthermore, all of
the Arctic nations, except Norway, have opted out of binding dispute resolution
for such claims under UNCLOS. Accordingly, UNCLOS is unsuitable for
resolving disputes surrounding the North Pole.
With countries jockeying for position, the struggle for control of the Arctic
has started to unfold. This Comment will discuss the legal issues that the
international community will likely confront in the coming decades with respect
to the Arctic. I find that UNCLOS, the current legal regime, will prove
inadequate for resolving the overlapping claims to the Arctic that are sure to
develop in upcoming years. I next consider the applicability of other traditional
legal theories about the continental shelf, including geological circumstances,
historical practice, the equidistance principle, coastline proportionality, landmass
proportionality, and economic conditions. I conclude that overlapping
continental shelf claims would be best resolved by a multilateral agreement
similar to the Antarctic Treaty System.
Section I provides background information on Arctic geography and traces
the development of early maritime law and the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine. It
goes on to discuss President Truman's 1945 Proclamation on the Continental
Shelf and the international community's response prior to implementation of
UNCLOS. Section II gives an overview of the important and relevant provisions
of UNCLOS, including sovereignty limits, navigation provisions, regulations of
the deep seabed, and methods of dispute resolution. Section III applies
UNCLOS to the two current continental shelf disputes in the Arctic and argues
that UNCLOS is inadequate to resolve these disputes and any others that might
arise in that region. Section IV examines the viability of alternative legal claims
of title to the Arctic. Section V posits that one acceptable solution would be to
model an international Arctic agreement after the Antarctic Treaty System.
I. BASIC GEOGRAPHY AND RELEVANT HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARCTIC
A. ARCTIC GEOGRAPHY OVERVIEW
The Arctic Ocean is the world's smallest ocean. It spans just fourteen
million square-kilometers, which makes it less than twice the size of the United

12

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), 1833 UN Treaty Ser 3, 397 (1994)
("UNCLOS'.
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States.13 In common parlance, the term "Arctic" refers to the region surrounding
the North Pole, delineated by the Arctic Circle. 14 Five countries have territory
within the Arctic Circle: Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Norway, Russia, and
the United States (via Alaska). 5 These five countries are often collectively called
the "Arctic" nations. 6
Roughly half of the Arctic Ocean's floor is "continental shelf," or, shallow
extensions of the bordering countries' land. The other half of the Arctic Ocean
is a deep basin. 7 On the surface, the ocean consists of a large polar icecap for
most of the year.' 8 However, recent scientific research suggests that the polar
icecap is rapidly melting. 9 If the icecap continues to melt, the region will
become more navigable for commerce and more accessible for mining. For
example, based on estimates from the US Geological Survey, the Arctic could
contain up to 25 percent of the world's energy resources.2 °

17

Central Intelligence Agency, The 2008 World Factbook:Arctic Ocean (Feb 28, 2008), available online
at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xq.html> (visited Apr
5, 2008) ("CIA World Factbook'".
The Arctic Circle is defined by a line of latitude located approximately sixty-six degrees north of
the Equator. United Nations, UN Atlas of the Oceans: Arctic Ecosystems, available online at
<http://www.oceansatlas.org/servlet/CDSServlet?status=ND02MzY3OSY2PWVuJjMzPSomM
zc9a29z> (visited Apr 5, 2008). The Arctic Circle coincides with the region of the Northern
Hemisphere for which there is at least one day per year during which the sun does not rise (winter
solstice) and one day per year during which the sun does not set (summer solstice). National
Snow and Ice Data Center, What is the Arctic?, available online at <http://nsidc.org/
arcticmet/basics/arcticdefinition.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
Nations Racefor Share of North: Five States Have Stake in Boundaries, Univ of Alberta (Mar 8, 2006),
available online at <http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/govrel/news.cfm?story=43835> (visited
Apr 5, 2008).
See, for example, Scott G. Borgerson, Artic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global
Warming, 87 Foreign Aff 63 (Mar/Apr 2008), available online at <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/
20080301faessay87206/scott-g-borgerson/arctic-meltdown.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008); Stephen
Beard, The Great Arctic Sea Grab, Am Pub Media, available online at <http://marketplace.
publicradio.org/features/frozenassets/frozenassets-beardseagrab.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
CIA World Factbook (cited in note 13).

18

Id.

19

See, for example, National Snow and Ice Data Center, Arctic Sea Ice ShattersAllPreviousRecordLows

13
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1 (Oct 1, 2007), available online at <http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/
20071001_pressrelease.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008). This study reveals that between 2005 and 2007
alone, nearly 25 percent of the Arctic's permanent ice cover was lost.
20

See Paul Reynolds, Russia Ahead in Arctic 'Gold Rush,' BBC News (Aug 1, 2007), available online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/indepth/6925853.stm> (visited Apr 5, 2008). The survey that
this article relies on is US Geological Survey, Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the
East GreenlandRift Basins Province (2007), available online at <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2007/3077
/pdf/FS07-3077_508.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
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B.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS DOCTRINE AND EARLY USES OF

THE ARCTIC OCEAN (1 608-1945)
In 1608, international lawyer Hugo Grotius published a short treatise in
which he argued that the world's oceans constitute a common resource
belonging to everyone.2' This familiar proposition became known as the
Freedom of the Seas Doctrine and still forms the basis for modern maritime
law.22 Grotius argued that because the oceans are fluid, they cannot be
demarcated or occupied.2 3 Grotius also pointed out that navigation, a primary
use of the high seas, was what economists today would call "nonrival"-one
country's use of the oceans for navigation did not impede another country's
ability to navigate.24 Similarly, Grotius considered fishing, another important
activity on the high seas, inexhaustible. 21 It was not until the mid-twentieth
century that the world built up other major uses of the oceans.26
C. TWENTIETH-CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS (1945-1982)

1. Military Strategy in the Arctic
Over time, the Arctic Ocean (like the other oceans) was adapted for uses
other than just navigation and fishing. In the 1930s, the world turned to the
Arctic for military pursuits. 27 After World War I, Canada and the United States
developed defense projects in the Arctic based on perceived transpolar threats
from the Soviet Union. 28 The Arctic became a military focal point because it
21

Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum 57 (Oxford 1916) (Ralph Van Deman, trans):

22

The reason for the difference between the sea on one hand and land and rivers
on the other, is that in the case of the sea the same primitive right of nations
regarding fishing and navigation... was never separated from the community
right of all mankind, and attached to any person or group of persons.
Rebecca Bratspies, FinessingKing Neptune: Fisheries Management and the Limits of InternationalLaw, 25
Harv Envtl L Rev 213, 219 (2001).

23

Id at 220.

24

Id at 219-20.

25

See Grotius, Mare Liberum 57 (cited in note 21):

26

[I]n the case of the sea the same primitive right of nations regarding fishing
and navigation which existed in the earliest times, still today exists
undiminshed and always will .. .. [E]very one admits that if a great many
persons hunt on the land or fish in a river, the forest is easily exhausted of wild
animals and the river of fish, but such a contingency is impossible in the case
of the sea.
Ann L. Hollick, U.S. Foreign Poligy and the Law of the Sea 6 (Princeton 1981).

27

See Kenneth C. Eyre, Forty Years of Militagy Activity in the CanadianNorth, 1947-87, 40 Arctic 292,
294 (1987).

28

Id.
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comprised the shortest route between Russia and North America.2 9 During
World War II, the Arctic was crucial for German and Russian submarine
convoys. 3° As World War II accounted for significant development in the
Arctic,3' the underpinnings of Grotius's model (free navigation and fishing,
shared by all nations) became less realistic in describing how nations and
individuals used the oceans.
2. The Truman Proclamation
The early twentieth century saw the growth and development of several
new industries that extracted resources from the world's oceans. The first
offshore petroleum wells were drilled in the 1920s, and in 1933, the Texas Oil
Company built the first mobile drilling barge.32 Shortly thereafter, Louisiana
started leasing offshore tracts in the Gulf of Mexico. 3
In 1945, in one of the first and most provocative deviations from the
Freedom of the Seas Doctrine, 34 US President Harry S. Truman asserted that the
United States had jurisdiction over all resources on its continental shelf.35 Some
commentators suggest that President Truman urgently wanted to conserve oil
resources near the end of World War 11,36 but others believe that the President
also had federalism concerns on his mind. 37 By 1945, several coastal states,

29

Joseph S. Roucek, The Geopolitics of the Arctic, 42 Am J Econ Soc 463, 464 (1983).

30

Id.

31

See generally Eyre, Forty Years (cited in note 27).

32

William R. Freudenburg and Robert Gramling, Oil in Troubled Waters. Perceptions, Politics, and the
Battle Over Offshore Drilling 17-18 (SUNY 1994).

33

Id at 18.

34

The International Court ofJustice, for example, has described the Proclamation:
Although this instrument was not the first or only to have appeared, it has in
the opinion of the Court a special status.... [It] came to be regarded as the
starting point of the positive law on the subject, and the chief doctrine it
enunciated, namely that of the coastal State as having an original, natural, and
exclusive (in short a vested) right to the continental shelf off its shores, came
to prevail over all others.
North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases (Gerv Den, GervNeth), 1969 ICJ 3, 32-33 (Feb 20, 1969).

35

36
37

Poligy of the UnitedStates With Respect to the NaturalResources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental
Shelf Procl No 2667 (Sept 28, 1945), 1945 Pub Papers 150, 150 (nullified by the Outer
Continental Shelf Land Acts, 43 USC §§ 1331 et seq (2000) (codifying the Proclamation)).
See Peter Prows, Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of UNCLOS Property Law (And
What Is to Be Done About It), 42 Tex Int L J 241, 252 (2006).
For example, on the same day that he issued the Proclamation, President Truman announced an
Executive Order, placing all coastal natural resources under the control of the Secretary of the
Interior. Reserving and Plating Certain Resources of the ContinentalShelf under the Controland Juisdictionof
the Secretagy of the Interior,Exec Order No 9633 (Sep 28, 1945), 3 CFR 1945 Supp 437 (1945); see
also Richard Breeden, Federalism and the Development of Outer ContinentalShelf Mineral Resources, 28
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including California, Texas, and Louisiana, had developed lucrative local
offshore drilling industries. Predictably, the Proclamation generated litigation in
the United States between these coastal states and the federal government, both
of whom wanted to assert rights to offshore drilling.38 A series of decisions by
the US Supreme Court, however, affirmed the President's proposition that the
continental shelf was subject to federal, rather than state, jurisdiction. 39 The
Truman Proclamation also sparked other countries to make similar claims to
their continental shelves.4° The spirit of the Proclamation was ultimately codified
by Congress as the Outer Continental Shelf Land Acts of 1953. 4'
3. Tragedy of the Commons
Like any common resource, the world's oceans eventually became
vulnerable to overexploitation, and Grotius's key assumption of limitless ocean
resources unraveled. In the 1970s, for example, offshore drilling for oil and
natural gas skyrocketed.42 Unsurprisingly, most commercial uses for the seas
have become subject to this tragedy of the commons;4 3 scholars have chronicled

38

Stan L Rev 1107, 1111 (1976) (suggesting that the Truman Proclamation was a response to
depleted federal resources after the Depression).
See, for example, US v California, 332 US 19 (1947); US v Louisiana,339 US 699 (1950).

41

Freudenburg and Gramling, Oil in Troubled Waters at 20 (cited in note 32).
Henry M. Arruda, Comment, The Extension of the United States Temitorial Sea: Reasons and Effects, 4
ConnJ Intl L 697, 704 (1989); see also United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of
the Sea, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A HistoricalPerspective) (1998), available
online
at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/convention_
historical-perspective.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008) (listing other countries that claimed jurisdiction
over their continental shelves and nearby seas) ("UNCLOS (A HistoricalPerspective)'). Of course,
these claims are no longer significant because UNCLOS grants each nation sovereignty to up to
350 nautical miles of its continental shelf, as described in Section II.A and II.C.
43 USC § 1331 et seq. Section 1332 provides that "the subsoil and seabed of the outer

42

Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and
power of disposition as provided in this subchapter."
Jack N. Barkenbus, The Politics of Ocean ResourceExploitation, 21 Intl Studies Q 675, 678 (1977).

39
40

43

See, for example, Alexandra Merle Post, Deepsea Mining and the Law of the Sea 66 (Brill 1983)
("Global commons are like the common pastures in medieval villages that were originally open
for use by all village inhabitants. Finally, however, the pastures were fenced off for private use,
just as states are 'fencing off' parts of the ocean for exclusive national use and control today.").
Post's analysis replicates Garret Hardin's original pastoral example in his famous work. See Garret
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci 1243, 1244 (1968).
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the problems associated with overfishing, 44 water pollution, 4' and damage to
ocean ecology.46
In 1967, Arvid Pardo, Malta's Ambassador to the United Nations, made
the first appeal for an international legal regime to govern the oceans.47 In his
address to the United Nations General Assembly, Pardo emphasized the
pollution problems, territorial disputes, resource exploitation, and military
rivalries that had been taking over the oceans for the better part of the twentieth
century. 48 After Pardo's address, coastal nations mobilized to claim jurisdiction
over adjacent waters. For example, between 1967 and 1973, 81 countries made
231 jurisdictional claims under the previous international convention governing
the continental shelf.49 Pardo's effort eventually culminated in UNCLOS, which
opened for signature in 1982 and entered into force in 1994, one year after
Guyana became the fifty-ninth country to ratify the treaty.5"
II. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:
THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME
The 186-page UNCLOS, 1 often referred to as the "constitution of the
oceans," is considered one of the most expansive international agreements in the
world.52 UNCLOS governs nearly every aspect of maritime law, including
sovereignty limits, navigation, seabed mining, and environmental protection of

44

46

See Jeremy B.C. Jackson, et al, Historical Oveosbing and the Recent Collapse of CoastalEcosystems, 293
Sci 629 (2001).
See Victor Petaccio, Water Pollution and the FutureLaw of the Sea, 21 Intl & Comp L Q 15 (1972).
See Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern, The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 Sci

47

1907 (2003).
UNCLOS (A HistoricalPerspective) (cited in note 40).

45

48
49
50

51
52

Id.
Post, Deepsea Mining at 70 (cited in note 43).
United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Table Recapitulatingthe Status of
the Convention and of the Related Agreements, as at 26 October 2007, available online at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/status2007.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008) ("Status of
the Convention").
UNCLOS (cited in note 12).
See, for example, Prows, 42 Tex Intl L J at 241 (cited in note 36) (remarking that UNCLOS's
adoption marked "the most significant achievement for international law since the U.N.
Charter."); see also United Nations, Oceans: The Lifeline of Our Planet, available online at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convenion-agreements/convention -2years/oceansthelifeline.
htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008) (calling UNCLOS "[one of the most significant legal instruments of
the 20th Century').
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the world's oceans."3 It also provides a legal framework for resolving oceanrelated disputes.5 4
Four of the five nations that border the Arctic Circle are parties to
UNCLOS. In 1996, Norway became the first Arctic nation to ratify the treaty.
Russia (1997), Canada (2003), and Denmark (2004) all followed. 5
The United States is the only Arctic-bordering country that is not a party to
UNCLOS. It has signed the treaty, but the US Senate has not ratified it, 6 and
thus UNCLOS is not legally binding on the US.5 7 Originally, President Ronald
Reagan refused to sign the treaty based on its deep seabed mining provisions,
which imposed limits on deep seabed mining by allowing the International
Seabed Authority ("Authority") to set production limits;58 required developed
countries to share their mining technology with others; 9 gave a competitive
advantage to the Authority itself as against private mining companies;6" and
required profit-sharing among countries.61
The deep seabed mining provisions were revised between 1990 and 1994,
with significant input from the United States.62 The 1994 agreement addressed
the US's concerns, and in 1994, President Bill Clinton signed UNCLOS.63
Despite these concessions, the Senate still has not ratified the treaty. More
recently, critics of ratification have argued that UNCLOS is needlessly

53

See generally UNCLOS (cited in note 12).

54

See id, arts 279-99.

55

See Status of the Convention (cited in note 50).
Somewhat confusingly, no US president has technically signed the entire UNCLOS. President
Ronald Reagan objected to the deep seabed mining provisions (Part V1), so he approved the
entire Convention, save those troublesome provisions, by executive order. When Part VI was
revised in 1994, President Bill Clinton signed the revised agreement. Thus, every part of
UNCLOS has been signed by a president (albeit in two pieces), but the US Senate has never
ratified any part of it.

56

57

58

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 1155 UN Treaty Ser 331 (1980). Article 16
provides that "[u]nless the treaty otherwise provides, instruments of ratification . . . establish the
consent of a State to be bound by a treaty."
President Ronald Reagan, Statement on US Poliq and the Law of the Sea, reprinted in 82 Dept St Bull
54 (Mar 1982) ("President Reagan Statement").

59

Id at 54.

60

Id at 54-55.

61

UNCLOS, art 160 (cited in note 12).

62

See United Nations, Consultaionsof the Secretary-Generalon Outstanding Issues Relating to the Dep Seabed
Mining Provisions of the UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc A/48/950 (1994).
Steven Greenhouse, US, Haing Won Changes, Is Set to Sign Law of the Sea, NY Times Al 0 ul 1,

63

1994).
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complicated and disadvantageous to American military and economic interests. 64
Some commentators argue that ratifying UNCLOS is unnecessary because the
US already recognizes many provisions of the treaty as customary international
law.65 Furthermore, the US has given insight and guidance to several important
UNCLOS provisions, despite not being a party to the treaty.6 6 On the other side,
advocates of ratification argue that the US currently forfeits leadership and
control of the Arctic by dispensing with the treaty.67
Now, the US Senate may attempt to ratify UNCLOS. President George W.
Bush has publicly supported accession to the treaty," and a majority of the
Senate is likely to agree with the President. 69 The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee recently approved UNCLOS, 0 but ratification requires a two-thirds
majority in the Senate,71 which may be difficult to achieve.72
A. SOVEREIGNTY LIMITS
Among the most important provisions of UNCLOS-and those most
relevant to this Comment-are those delineating areas of the oceans in which
coastal states may exercise sovereignty. First, UNCLOS defines a nation's
"territorial sea" as the ocean space that extends twelve nautical miles from its

64

See, for example, Doug Bandow, Don't Resurrect the Law of the Sea Treay, 59 J Ind Aff 25, 25-28

65

Id at 25.

66

See, for example, Eric Posner, The Race to the Arctic and International Law, The University of
Chicago Law School Faculty Blog (Aug 13, 2007), available online at <http://uchicagolaw.
typepad.com/faculty/2007/08/the-race-to-the.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008):

(2005).

67

The United States is not going to be deprived of a seat at the table even if it is
not a treaty member. Canada, Norway, and Denmark know that their claims
against Russia are not worth much unless the United States takes their side. So
a virtual or indirect seat will be found, in some way or another.
See John Norton Moore and William L. Schachte, Jr., The Senate Should Give Immediate Advice and

68

Consent to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Why the Criics are Wrong, 59 J Ind Aff 1, 2 (2005).
President's Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in the World's Oceans (May 15, 2007), available online at

69

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070515-2.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
See Jim Abrams, Senate Panel Backs Sea Treaty, AP (Oct 31, 2007) available online at
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-10-31-4249042446_x.htm> (visited Apr 5,
2008). Abrams points out that UNCLOS remains a partisan issue, with Republican lawmakers
tending to oppose ratification and Democratic lawmakers tending to support it. Because the
Senate is currently controlled by a Democratic majority, the treaty earns majority support.

70

Id.

71

US Const, art II, § 2.
Several senators who oppose ratification have threatened to defeat such an attempt if it is
introduced. See Stephen Dinan, Senate Panel OKs Sea Treaty, but Fight Looms, Wash Times A01
(Nov 1, 2007).

72
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coastal low-water mark.73 Under UNCLOS, the territorial sea basically functions
as a continuation of the country's land territory; within the territorial sea, nations
may exercise complete sovereignty over the water, seabed, and air space.74
Second, UNCLOS recognizes a "contiguous zone" beyond the territorial
sea. A country's contiguous zone is defined as the ocean space between twelve
and twenty-four nautical miles from the coastal low-water mark.7' Article 33
provides that a nation may use its contiguous zone to enforce and to prevent
infringement of its fiscal, customs, immigration, and sanitary laws and
regulations. For example, a nation may stop and arrest foreign drug smugglers
76
within its contiguous zone.
Finally, UNCLOS defines a country's "exclusive economic zone" as the
area between twenty-four and two hundred nautical miles from a nation's coastal
low-water mark. 7 A country may exercise sovereignty over the natural resources
in, on, and below the seabed in its exclusive economic zone, and it maintains
sole control over any other activities for the economic exploitation and
exploration of the zone. 8
Even though the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it is bound by
the sovereignty limits described above through historical compliance, an earlier
treaty,7 9 and several presidential proclamations. In 1983, President Ronald
Reagan issued a proclamation recognizing the United States's exclusive
economic zone, as provided in UNCLOS, writing, "the United States will
recognize the rights of other States in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in
the Convention, so long as the rights and freedoms of the United States and
others under international law are recognized by such coastal States."8 ° In 1988,
another Reagan proclamation stated that the United States's territorial sea would

73

UNCLOS, arts 2-3, 5 (cited in note 12).

74

Id, art 2.

75

Id, art 33.

76

James Keeley, InternationalMaritime Law and the Interdiction of Movements of Weapons of Mass Destruction
by Sea 5 (2004), available online at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/isrop/research/keeley2004/psi_wmd_keeley.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008).

77

UNCLOS, art 57 (cited in note 12).

78

Id, art 56.

79

Even though the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, it is a party to an earlier international
treaty that recognizes some of the territorial limits described above. See Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1961), 15 UST 1606, 1608-09 (1964). The Convention
recognizes both the territorial sea and contiguous zone. The Convention delimits the contiguous
zone but not the territorial sea.
Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States of America, Proclamation No 5030 (Mar 10,

s0

1983), 3 CFR Supp 22 (1983).
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extend twelve nautical miles from its coastline." Finally, in 1999, President Bill
Clinton issued a proclamation that recognized the contiguous zone, consistent
with UNCLOS.82
B. NAVIGATION PROVISIONS
UNCLOS also describes navigational rights in the oceans. For example,
Articles 17-19 create a right of passage for all ships to travel through the
territorial seas of a coastal state.83 Article 38 also allows ships to pass through
other countries' exclusive economic zones.84 For these rights of passage,
UNCLOS simply requires that the passage be peaceful, continuous, and
expedient.85 The current debate over sovereignty of the Northwest Passage
implicates the provisions on the right of transit passage. Canada has argued that
the Northwest Passage is part of its internal waters, and therefore exempt from
the Article 38, while most other countries believe the Northwest Passage is a
strait, and therefore open to everyone.86
C. REGULATING THE SEABED
UNCLOS also regulates uses of the ocean floor. Historically, regulation of
the seabed has been somewhat controversial. In 1916, a Spanish public official

81

Territorial Sea of the United States of America, Proclamation No 5928 (Dec 27, 1988), 3 CFR

82

Supp 547 (1988).
Contiguous Zone of the United States, Proclamation No 7219 (Sept 2, 1999), 3 CFR Supp 98

83

(1999).
Article 17 provides: "[A]ll States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea." UNCLOS, art 17 (cited in note 12).

84

Article 38 provides:
In straits [in a coastal country's exclusive economic zone], all ships and aircraft
enjoy the right of transit passage [unless] the strait is formed by an island of a
State bordering the strait and its mainland [and] there exists seaward of the
island a route through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of
similar convenience.

85

86

Id, art 38.
Articles 18 and 19 explain that the right of innocent passage must be continuous, expeditious, and
peaceful. Id, arts 18-19. Article 39 provides the same rules for the right of transit passage. Id, art
39.
The Northwest Passage is an ocean route through the Arctic Ocean, along the Northern coast of
Canada. The passage meanders through Canada's Arctic Archipelago, which has led to territorial
disputes over the path. Though the legal status of the Northwest Passage is ambiguous, the
United States has sent ships to traverse the passage, despite express warnings from Canada not to
do so. See Gethin Chamberlain, Ice Melts Opening Up Northwest Passage,Telegraph (Sept 15, 2007),
available online at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/main.jhtml?xml=/earth/2007/09/15/
eaNW115.xml> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
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suggested that nations should have jurisdiction over their continental shelves.8"
To that end, in 1925 the League of Nations considered a proposal for
international fishing regulation of the shelf.88 The proposal failed,8 9 and
President Truman's 1945 proclamation of the United States' rights to its
continental shelf was the first assertive claim of its kind.
Along those lines, UNCLOS recognizes up to 350 nautical miles of
nations' continental shelves from the coastal low-water mark.9" UNCLOS
defines a country's continental shelf as "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation
of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin."'" UNCLOS
allows countries to exercise exclusive sovereignty over their continental shelves
and the natural resources found there.9 2 Extended sovereignty over the
continental shelf does not confer sovereignty over the water above.93
On parts of the ocean floor that extend beyond these regions of
sovereignty, however, UNCLOS places restrictions on seabed mining. As
discussed above, industrialized nations originally objected to UNCLOS on the
basis that the deep seabed mining provisions, which prohibited mining in the
high seas, were too restrictive.94 In response, between 1990 and 1994 the United
Nations coordinated negotiations to revise the problematic deep seabed mining
provisions. The revisions replaced the contentious production limits with
market-oriented restrictions on subsidies and prohibitions on discrimination
between seabed minerals and minerals from other sources9" by removing the
requirement to share technology and substituting a duty to "cooperate" to the

87

C.H.M. Waldock, The Legal Basis of Claims to the Continental Shelf in Problems of Public and Private
InternationalLaw, 36 Transactions of the Grotius Society 115, 122 (1950).

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

UNCLOS, art 76 (cited in note 12). As explained in Section II.A, UNCLOS provides nations with
exclusive control over the water and seabed up to 200 nautical miles from their coasts. UNCLOS,
art 57 (cited in note 12). Article 76 simply allows nations to earn recognition of an additional 150
nautical miles of seabed by applying to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

91

Id, art 76.

92

Id, art 77.

93

Id, art 78.

94

See generally John Alton Duff, UNCLOS and the New Deep Seabed Mining Regime: The Risks of
Refuting the Treay, 19 Suffolk Transnatl L Rev 1, 2-11 (1995) (noting that most industrialized
nations refused to ratify UNCLOS based on similar concerns to those articulated by the United
States). The original seabed provisions were troublesome enough that the treaty was not ratified
until 1994, after those provisions were changed. See Status of the Convention (cited in note 50).

95

Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 33 ILM 1309, annex, § 6, 1(d) (1994) ("Agreement').
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extent consistent with intellectual property protections,9 6 by requiring the
Authority to comply with all requirements of private miners,9" and by requiring
that any decision about the distribution of surplus money be approved by the
finance committee (of which the United States was a member).98
The new provisions were adopted by the United Nations in 1994, at which
point President Bill Clinton signed UNCLOS. Today, the Authority manages all
deep seabed mining by issuing permits to private and public entities to explore
and exploit certain areas of the deep sea; as such, it has exclusive control over
these activities in the deep seabed. 99
D. RESOLVING DISPUTES UNDER UNCLOS
The remedial provisions of UNCLOS indicate a strong preference for
peaceful resolution of disputes. Article 279 provides that parties should first try
to settle disputes informally."' 0 If two countries are unable to settle a dispute on
their own, UNCLOS provides four methods of resolution. Parties can use the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice,
or one of two arbitral tribunals. 10'
When a country ratifies UNCLOS, it may choose a forum for settling its
disputes under the Convention. If a dispute exists between two countries that
have elected different fora, UNCLOS directs the parties to use arbitration,
02
unless they agree otherwise. The Arctic nations have elected different fora.1
Article 298, however, allows each nation to decline to accept any method of
resolution for various categories of disputes, including boundary disputes
96

Id, annex,

5,

97

Id, annex,

2, 1 4.

98

Id, annex,

3,

99

See UNCLOS, art 137 (cited in note 12):

100

All rights in the resources of the [deep seabed] are vested in mankind as a whole, on
whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not subject to alienation. The
minerals recovered from the [deep seabed] however, may only be alienated in
accordance with this Part and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority.
Id, art 279 ("States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or

1(b).

7.

application of this Convention by peaceful means ...
101 Id, art 287.
102

.

Canada elected to resolve disputes in the International Court of Justice or by special arbitration
under Annex VII. Denmark and Norway elected the International Court of Justice. Russia elected
arbitration under Annex VII, except for disputes related to fisheries, the environment, scientific
research, and navigation, for which it elected arbitration under Annex VII; and disputes related to
detained vessels and crews, for which it elected the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.

United Nations, The Law of the Sea: Declarations and Statements with Respect to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and to the Agreement Relating to the Implementation ofPart XI of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 98-101 (UN 1997) ("Declarations").
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between countries with opposite or adjacent territorial seas, exclusive economic
zones, or continental shelves. °3 Canada, Denmark, and Russia all indicated that
they do not accept any of the procedures for the resolution of disputes provided
for under Article 298.104 As described in more detail in Section III, Arctic
disputes will likely fall under this Article 298 exception, which suggests that there
will be no mandatory forum for deciding the claims.
III. ARCTIC DISPUTES OVER THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
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This Section considers geologically contentious areas in the Arctic and the
disputes that are likely to arise there. It also examines an existing dispute
between Russia and Norway, but concludes that because those countries have
come to an agreement, the substantive provision of UNCLOS will not be used
to decide the overlapping claims there. Finally, this Section considers how
103

Article 298 provides:
When signing, ratifying, or acceding to this Convention or at any time
thereafter, a State may ... declare in writing that it does not accept any one or
more of the procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to ... disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83.

104

UNCLOS, art 298 (cited in note 12). Articles 15, 74, and 83 respectively address delimitations of
the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf between states with
opposite or adjacent coasts. UNCLOS, arts 15, 74, 83 (cited in note 12).
Declarations (cited in note 102).
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UNCLOS will apply in future overlapping continental shelf disputes in the
Arctic.
A. THE LOMONosov RIDGE
The Lomonosov mountain ridge runs through the Arctic Ocean, from the
New Siberian Islands (north of the middle of Russia) to Ellesmere Island (a
Canadian island between the mainland of Canada and Greenland). °5 Russian
scientists discovered the ridge in the late 1940s. 106 The recent Russian submarine
journey to the North Pole seabed was, at least in part, an attempt to collect
geological data to support Russia's claim to the Lomonosov Ridge, including the
North Pole. 0 7 Denmark has argued, though, that the Ridge was previously
connected to Greenland."' Because the Lomonosov Ridge approaches Russia,
Greenland, and Canada, it is likely to become a contentious area of the Arctic as
nations grow increasingly interested in appropriating access to polar resources.
As described in Section III.C below, the language of UNCLOS will not resolve a
legal dispute in which different countries all claim areas of the
Arctic based on
09
distinct geological connections to the same mountain range.1
B. THE BARENTS SEA LooP HOLE AND THE WESTERN
NANSEN BASIN
The Barents Sea is located north of Norway and Russia. In the middle,
there is a large, shallow basin called the Barents Sea Loop Hole. Russia and
Norway have submitted overlapping claims for sovereignty in this area."' The
Western Nansen Basin is another large Arctic basin, located north of the Barents
Sea."' Russia and Norway have submitted overlapping claims to the Western
Nansen Basin as well. 1 2 For both the Barents Sea Loop Hole and the Western
Nansen Basin, the Norwegian claims are decidedly more modest. 1 3 In general,

105

Donat Pharand, Freedom of the Seas in theArctic Ocean, 19 U Toronto LJ 210, 214-15 (1969).

106

Idat214.

107

Russians to Dive, BBC News (cited in note 2).

108 See

110

Gold Rush under the Ice, Economist (Aug 3, 2007), available online at
<http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story-jd=9607005> (visited Apr
5, 2008).
J.R. Cochran, M.H. Edwards, and B.J. Coakley, Mophology and Stmcture of the Lomonosov Ridge, Arctic
Ocean, 7 Geochem Geophys Geosyst 1 (2006).
See Nonay Execulive Summary 11 (cited in note 11).

1

Id at 14.

112

Id at 11.

113

See generally id.
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Norway does not seem to be very aggressive about pursuing large claims to the
Arctic seabed, especially because the country has already admitted that its
continental shelf does not extend to the North Pole.' Russia, on the other
hand, has submitted an expansive, 1.2 million square-kilometer claim in the
Arctic."' In 2002, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
("Commission")," 6 recognized these overlapping claims and suggested that if
Russia and Norway come to an agreement and submit documentation, the
Commission will accept the recommendation." 7 Furthermore, in making its
claim in 2006, Norway acknowledged that it was negotiating with Russia and
that both countries had agreed to submit any agreement to the Commission."'
Because Norway and Russia seem likely to negotiate on both problems, it is
unlikely that either of these disputes will seriously question the ability of
UNCLOS to handle overlapping Arctic claims. However, as countries become
more aggressive in pursuing claims for continental shelf resources, negotiation
may break down, and the UNCLOS framework could be tested.
C. UNCLOS's APPLICATION (OR LACK THEREOF)
As described in Section II.C, UNCLOS allows a country to claim an
additional 150 nautical miles of territory beyond its exclusive economic zone, as
long as the country can establish that the additional territory is part of the
"natural prolongation of its land territory.""' 9 In the event that countries with
opposite or adjacent coasts submit overlapping claims, Article 83 instructs the
countries to agree on a boundary. If the countries cannot come to an agreement
within a "reasonable period of time," Article 83 directs them to resort to the
remedial provisions of UNCLOS. However, as previously discussed in Section
II.D above, Article 298 allows nations to opt out of the binding dispute
resolution provisions for disputes that arise under Article 83. All Arctic nations

114

See Store, The Law of the Sea and the High North (cited in note 10).

115 Richard A. Lovett, Russia's Arctic Claim Backed by Rocks, Offidals Say, Nat Geog (Sept 21, 2007),

118

available
online
at
<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/09/070921 -arcticrussia.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is a body established by UNLCOS that
evaluates countries' continental shelf claims. See generally UNCLOS, annex, § 2 (creating the
Commission and outlining its functions). As described in Section Il.C, Article 76 permits a
country to earn recognition of an additional 150 nautical miles of its continental shelf,provided it
can prove that its land territory extends that distance. See UNCLOS, art 76 (cited in note 12).
United Nations, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, Report of the Secretary-Generalat 9, 38-39, UN Doc
A/57/57/Add 1 (2002).
Norway Execulive Summary at 12 (cited in note 11).

119

UNCLOS, art 76 (cited in note 12). See also note 90.
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117
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except Norway have exercised this option.120 Thus, it appears that UNCLOS
does not mandate any method of resolution for the current disputes between
Russia and Norway or for any other potential Arctic dispute (such as one over
the Lomonosov Ridge). Because Norway is the sole Arctic nation that is willing
to participate in binding dispute resolution for overlapping continental shelf
claims, UNCLOS will necessarily be incapable of resolving any disagreement
involving these claims to the Arctic. Sections IV and V discuss alternative legal
arguments that Arctic countries may invoke and suggests a solution to avoid
excessive exploitation of resources and further conflict in the area.
IV. ANTICIPATED LEGAL ARGUMENTS
Given that UNCLOS does not provide a forum for resolving overlapping
continental shelf disputes in the North Pole, countries might assert a variety of
legal arguments, either in future claims submitted to the Commission of the
Limits on the Continental Shelf or informally through the media.' 2 ' This Section
will consider some of the arguments that countries might raise, first considering
the limited UNCLOS precedent on continental shelf disputes and then turning
to traditional theories of property acquisition.
A. THE UNCLOS FRAMEWORK
Though UNCLOS does not provide a binding method of resolution for
overlapping continental shelf disputes in the Arctic, these countries might use
UNCLOS precedent to bolster their claims. The International Court of Justice
("ICj") has decided three overlapping continental shelf disputes since its
inception in 1946.122 The ICJ applied UNCLOS as customary law in two of these
three disputes: Tunisia v Libya and Libya v Malta.123 The remaining dispute, The

120
121

122

123

See Section II.D.
For example, Russia and Norway have both complied with the formal UNCLOS process by
submitting claims to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. See Norway Executive
Summary at 6 (cited in note 11); United Nations, Commission on Limits of ContinentalShelf Receives its
First Submission: Russian Federation First to Move to Establish Outer Limits of its Extended Continental
Shelf UN Press Release SEA/1729 (Dec 12, 2001). Informally, Russia has urged a geological
argument. See Russians to Dive, BBC (cited in note 2). By contrast, Canada has argued that "the
first principle of Arctic sovereignty is use it or lose it." Canadato Strengthen Arctic Claim, BBC News
(Aug 10, 2007), available online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6941426.stm> (visited
Apr 5, 2008).
See North Sea Cases, 1969 ICJ 3 (cited in note 34); Case Concerning the Continental Sheff (Tunisia v
Libya), 1982 ICJ 18 (Feb 24, 1982); Case Concerning the ContinentalShef (Libya v Malta), 1985 ICJ 13
(June 3,1985).
The ICJ considered UNCLOS as customary law in Tunisia v Libya, 1982 ICJ at 47-49 and Libya v
Malta, 1985 ICJ at 29-33.
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North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, was decided in 1969, before UNCLOS was
drafted. 124 However, neither the ICJ nor the International Tribunal on the Law
of the Sea have yet to resolve an overlapping continental shelf dispute in which
UNCLOS is binding treaty law.
As a matter of treaty interpretation, the plain language of UNCLOS does
not supply a method for deciding overlapping continental shelf disputes. The
language of Article 83 simply provides that these disputes should be decided "by
agreement on the basis of international law.., in order to achieve an equitable
solution.' 25 As the ICJ discussed in Libya v Malta, UNCLOS provides an endequitability-but no means of achieving it.'26 Because the language of the treaty
is unclear, the ICJ has focused on other principles of international law in
deciding overlapping continental shelf claims. The ICJ has also rejected
arguments that landmass proportionality or economic considerations should play
a role in delimiting continental shelves.
B. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW
As described in Section IV.A, the plain language of UNCLOS does not
provide a method for resolving overlapping continental shelf claims; it simply
requires that countries reach an "equitable solution."'' 27 Without a statutory
framework, Arctic countries will undoubtedly turn to traditional arguments that
have been successful in past continental shelf disputes. The most prominent
arguments include the geological circumstances, historical practice, the
equidistant principle, and coastline proportionality. After discussing these
traditional arguments, this Section will then briefly consider two other theories,
landmass proportionality and economic conditions, which have both been
rejected by ICJ.
1. Geological Circumstances
Under UNCLOS Article 76, geology forms the basis of any nation's claim
to extend recognition of its continental shelf beyond its exclusive economic
zone. The language of Article 76 describes the "continental shelf' in geological

124

125
126

127

See UNCLOS (A Histowcal Perspective) (cited in note 40) (indicating that the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, the body that wrote UNCLOS, convened in 1973).
UNCLOS, art 83 (cited in note 12).
Libya v Malta, 1985 ICJ at 30 ("[UNCLOS] sets a goal to be achieved, but is silent as to the
method to be followed to achieve it.").
UNCLOS, art 83 (cited in note 12).
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terms 128 and instructs coastal States to submit claims that include supporting
geological data. 129 Russia and Norway, the two Arctic countries who have
submitted claims to the Commission, both relied on extensive geological data
for support.13

Geology is sure to be an important element of any argument about Arctic
territory, but it is not dispositive. When countries submit overlapping claims or
have connected continental shelves, geology provides no method of drawing a
boundary line. UNCLOS recognizes this roadblock and provides that Article 76
does not apply to questions of delimiting the continental shelf between opposite
or adjacent states.' Because Arctic nations are so close together and are likely to
have connected continental shelves, geology will probably be unhelpful in
resolving continental shelf disputes. The ICJ recognized the same problem in
Tunisia v Libya 132 and suggested that it will be rare for geology to provide an
easily-defined boundary line. As a result, countries will probably continue to
advance geological arguments, but will bolster those arguments with other legal
theories.
2. Historical Practice
Because straightforward geology is unlikely to provide a clear resolution of
overlapping continental shelf disputes in the Arctic, countries might advance
historical arguments in two ways. First, a country might argue that its use or
occupation of a portion of the North Pole proves that other countries have
acquiesced to a boundary line. The ICJ was skeptical of this kind of argument in
Tunisia v Libya,133 but acknowledged that history should be a factor in delimiting
overlapping continental shelf claims. 34

128

See UNCLOS, art 76 (defining a country's continental shelf as the "natural prolongation of its
land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin," where the "continental margin" is
defined as the "submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal state").

129

Id.

130

See generally Norway Executive Summary 9-10 (cited in note 11) (discussing geological and

geomorphical characteristics of the continental shelf); Russian Federation First to Move, UN Press
Release SEA/1729 (cited in note 121) (noting that Russia submitted data to support its claim).
131 UNCLOS, art 76 (cited in note 12).
132

See Tunisia v Libya, 1982 ICJ at 47 ("It would be a mistake to suppose that it will in all cases, or

133

even in the majority of them, be possible or appropriate to establish that the natural prolongation
of one State extends, in relation to the natural prolongation of another State, just so far and no
farther, so that the two prolongations meet along an easily defined line.").
See id at 68 (rejecting Tunisia's claim that after using an area of the ocean for fishing, Libya had

134

acquiesced to a boundary line).
See id at 73 ('The historic rights remain however to be considered in themselves. Historic tides
must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have always been by long usage.").
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A latecomer could challenge a historical argument by arguing that
UNCLOS represents a move away from the historical rationales that were
typically employed by the ICJ in earlier continental shelf cases. For example,
UNCLOS allows historical consideration in disputes regarding adjacent or
opposite territorial seas, but not for disputes regarding adjacent or opposite
exclusive economic zones or continental shelves. 3 ' This language can be read to
affirm that UNCLOS did not intend historical considerations to factor into the
continental shelf disputes that will emerge in the Arctic.
On a theoretical level, one could similarly argue against the use of history
on the grounds that it seeks to supplant treaty law (UNCLOS) with customary
law. One commentator explained that custom is frequently used in international
law when there is a "glaring absence of law-creating agencies."' 36 In this case,
however, UNCLOS provides a legal framework, so an Arctic country could
argue that there is no need for a custom-based theory like history to be used. On
the other hand, one could respond that custom is available to fill gaps when
international treaties or statutes are insufficient; disputes over the continental
shelf fall into this category because UNCLOS is too ambiguous to provide
guidance for competing continental shelf claims. In the end, however, regardless
of the shortcomings of UNCLOS, history or occupation theory would certainly
frustrate UNCLOS's apparent goal of using legal rules to decide disputes.
Another pragmatic problem with embracing historical or occupational
arguments is that it may motivate overuses of Arctic resources if nations
scramble to use the area as quickly as possible. Unlike Tunisia v Liba, where
Tunisia had an eighty-year historical practice of fishing in the contested area, the
Arctic is much less settled. Therefore, if the theory is viable, it will probably
motivate Arctic countries to act quickly to occupy the North Pole and might also
encourage the type of symbolic (and inefficient) action that Russia took in
planting its flag.' 37
135

136

137

Compare UNCLOS, art 15 (cited in note 12) (allowing "historic title or other special
circumstances" to be used in delimiting the territorial sea between countries with opposite or
adjacent coasts) with UNCLOS, arts 74, 83 (lacking reference to the use of historical title for
delimiting the exclusive economic zones or continental shelves between countries with opposite
or adjacent coasts).
Anthony D. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in InternationalLaw 3 (Cornell 1971) (explaining that
custom is used because there are so few "law-creating agencies" in international law). For
example, D'Amato points out that there is no central court, no lower courts, no world legislature
that issues comprehensive international statutes, and few binding legal processes. Id at 3-4.
See Note, Thaw in International Law, 87 Yale L J 804, 819 (1978) (describing the "ritualistic
behavior" that countries undertook in order to "create the impression of such control in
Antarctica-dropping flags from airplanes, issuing stamps for use in claimed sectors, appointing
regional Antarctic 'administrator' and 'justices,' and staging symbolic tours and visits by homecountry heads of state").
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3. The Equidistant Principle
Before UNCLOS, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
("Geneva Convention") provided that continental shelf disputes for countries
with opposite or adjacent coasts should be determined by drawing a median line
between the two coasts, unless the countries came to another agreement or
special circumstances required a different arrangement. 13 8 This method of
delimitation, called the "equidistant principle," has been considered in all three
ICJ decisions on overlapping continental shelf disputes.'3 9 The equidistant
argument often serves as the court's starting point because it is grounded in the
language of the Geneva Convention and is invariably advanced by the smaller
also has the advantage of being convenient,
country. 4 ° The equidistant principle
141
apply.
to
easy
and
inexpensive,
Despite the benefits of the equidistant principles, ICJ has consistently
emphasized its willingness to depart from this theory of resolution.'4 2 In Libya v
Malta, for example, the court determined the boundary by finding the
equidistant median line between the two coasts and adjusting it to give Libya a
larger share based on its longer coastline.'43
Countries may also object to the equidistant principle on the grounds that
it is an artifact of an old treaty and was not incorporated by UNCLOS. In Libya
v Malta, the ICJ noted that UNCLOS failed to accept the equidistant principle.'"
To the extent that UNCLOS exhibits a preference for geologic-based
continental shelf claims, the equidistance principle may be undesirable because it

138

1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (1961), art 6, 15 UST 471 (1964) ("Geneva
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Convention").
See Libya v Malta, 1985 ICJ at 37-38; North Sea Cases, 1969 ICJ at 23-24; Tunisia v Libya, 1982 ICJ
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at 78-80.
For example, in Libya v Malta, Malta advanced an equidistance argument. Libya v Malta, 1985 ICJ

141

at 19. Similarly, in the North Sea Cases, Denmark and the Netherlands argued for an equidistant
boundary, 1969 ICJ at 23.
See id (describing the equidistant principle: "[N]o other of delimitation has the same combination

143

of practical convenience and certainty of application.").
See Libya v Malta, 1985 ICJ at 38 ("equidistance is [not] the only appropriate method of
delimitation, even between opposite or quasi-opposite coasts, nor even the only permissible point
of departure."); North Sea Cases, 1969 ICJ at 23 ("[the advantages of the equidistance principle] do
not suffice of themselves to convert what is a method into a rule of law, making the acceptance of
the result of using that method mandatory.").
Libya v Malta, 1985 ICJ at 56.
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Id at 36.
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could allow one country to exercise control over another country's continental
4
shelf.11
4. Coastline Proportionality and Sector Theory
Arctic nations with long coastlines are likely to argue for a larger share of
the continental shelf based on coastline proportionality. The ICJ used this
method of delimitation in Libya v Malta, allotting a larger share of the continental
shelf for Libya based on its much longer coastline. 1 46 In the Arctic, coastline
proportionality will probably be advanced by calling on "sector theory," a
historic method of claiming territory around the poles. Under sector theory, a
country might assert sovereignty over a pie-shaped area that is formed by
extending lines of longitude from its coast to one of the poles. 4 ' As applied to
the Arctic, each country's entitlement would be a wedge of the Arctic Circle,
proportional to its length of Arctic coastline.
Countries that object to coastline proportionality may argue for its limited
application. Though ICJ was willing to use coastline proportionality in L'bya v
Malta and the North Sea Cases,148 the court in both cases emphasized that
proportionality was only one of many factors. 14 Opposing countries may be able
to argue that coastline proportionality should only be used when other methods
of delimitation are inadequate to achieve an equitable result. 5 °
5. Landmass Contiguity or Proportionality
The surrounding countries might also claim sovereignty over portions of
the Arctic Ocean on the basis of geographic proximity or proportionality.
However, ICJ precedent suggests that these contiguity arguments are unlikely to
be persuasive. In Libya v Malta, Libya argued that it deserved a larger portion of
the continental shelf because it was a much larger country than Malta.' The
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See North Sea Cases, 1969 ICJ at 30 ("the use of the equidistance method would frequently cause
areas which are the natural prolongation or extension of the territory of one State to be attributed
to another').
See Libya v Malta, 1985 ICJ at 56.
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See Libya v Malta, 1985 ICJ at 44 (describing coastline proportionality as "a means of identifying
and then correcting the kind of distortion--disproportion-that could arise from the use of a
method inapt to take adequate account of some kinds of coastal configuration"); North Sea Cases,
1969 ICJ at 52 (mentioning coastline proportionality as a factor in drawing the boundary line).
For example, in Libya v Malta, the ICJ explained: "[Slince an equidistance line . .. may yield a
disproportionate result where a coast is markedly irregular or markedly concave or convex,.., the
raw equidistance method may leave out of the calculation appreciable lengths of coast .. " Libya
vMalta, 1985 ICJ at 44 (emphasis added).
Id at 41.
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court rejected this argument, writing that "[l]andmass has never been regarded as
a basis of entitlement to continental shelf rights, and such a proposition finds no
support in the practice of States, in the jurisprudence, in doctrine, or indeed in
the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea."
Similarly, the ICJ rejected a contiguity argument in the North Sea Cases, writing
"[s]ubmarine areas do not really appertain to the coastal State because-or not
only because-they are near it. They are near it of course; but this would not
suffice to confer title, any more than ... mere proximity confers per se title to
land territory." Commentators tend to agree with the ICJ, and it is safe to
assume that contiguity theory is not a viable solution for asserting title to
portions of the Arctic.'52 An additional problem is that, like geology, contiguity
theory suffers from the problem of not providing a framework for evaluating
disputes between countries with overlapping claims.
6. Economic Considerations
A final argument that Arctic countries may consider is one based on
economic circumstances. In Li'bya v Malta, for example, Malta asked the Court to
consider economic factors, including the absence of energy resources on the
island of Malta and its needs as a developing country.'53 The Court rejected this
argument, holding that a country's relative economic position has no bearing on
the delimitation of the continental shelf.'5 4 The ICJ dismissed similar arguments
from Tunisia in Tunisia v Libya, ruling that Tunisia's relative lack of natural
resources as compared to Libya was not a relevant factor in drawing the
boundary line.'55 With such negative precedent, economic arguments are likely to
be similarly unpersuasive in the Arctic.
V. MODELING AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AFTER THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM
The legal arguments presented in Section IV provide an incomplete
analysis of the potential problems that are likely to accompany overlapping
continental shelf disputes in the Arctic. Because UNCLOS does not require a
binding method of dispute resolution for overlapping continental shelf claims
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among Arctic nations," 6 the legal arguments described in Section IV are
available for countries to use, but need not be invoked in a formal legal setting.
This Section offers a proposal for a binding Arctic treaty, based loosely on the
Antarctic Treaty System.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM

The Antarctic Treaty System ("ATS") is a multilateral treaty that governs
activities in Antarctica. In 1959, twelve nations, including the United States,
entered into a multilateral treaty to govern Antarctica. These original signatories
consisted of the countries that had previously explored Antarctica and
conducted scientific research there."'7 The three main goals of ATS are to
preserve peace in Antarctica, to prevent military activity, and to promote
scientific research.5 8 To that end, ATS halts all territorial claims to the continent
for fifty years."' Only the United States and the Soviet Union, neither of which
have made any claims to date, have reserved the right to make territorial claims
in the future. 60 Under the later Madrid Protocol, ATS also halted all mining
activities in the continent.61 However, the Madrid Protocol includes an escape
clause that allows consultative countries to lift the ban by majority vote within
the fifty years following January 14, 1998 (the date the Protocol entered into
force).162
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See generally Section III.C, explaining that because Norway is the only Arctic nation that is willing
to participate in binding dispute resolution for overlapping continental shelf claims, UNCLOS
will necessarily be incapable of resolving any Arctic disputes.
The original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France,
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the United States. See Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, Antarctic Treaty System: Paries, available
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the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for assenting, supporting or denying a claim
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica.").

160

161

See Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, Antarctic Treaoy System: Parties, available online at
<http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats-parties.aspx?lang=e> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991), 30 ILM 1455 (1998)
("Madrid Protocol").

162

Id, art 25.

Summer 2008

ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw

B. APPLICATION OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY STRUCTURE TO
THE NORTH POLE
ATS could serve as a loose model for a multilateral Arctic treaty because it
was formulated in response to many of the same issues that currently exist in the
Arctic. Like the Arctic, Antarctica has no native population, and by the 1950s,
several countries had tried to claim parts of Antarctica.'6 3 In fact, Argentina,
Chile, and the United Kingdom had submitted overlapping claims to Antarctica
prior to the treaty.164 In addition, Antarctica potentially hosts vast oil resources,
which nations were eager to explore. 165 There are enough similarities between
the territorial and environmental concerns of both poles that ATS will be useful
in formulating a treaty for the Arctic. Ideally, an Arctic Treaty would provide a
binding method of resolving overlapping continental shelf disputes; comply with
the navigation, peaceful purpose, and environmental provisions of UNCLOS;
and establish basic rules to govern seabed mining.
There are several key differences that would make an Arctic agreement,
strictly modeled after the Antarctic Treaty, inappropriate. Most obviously,
Antarctica is a continent (a land mass), while the Arctic is an ocean. Countries
are interested in using the Arctic for navigation, 166 fishing, 16 mining, 16 and
defense, 69 while countries wanted to prevent these uses in the context of
Antarctica.'O For these reasons, the stringent protections afforded by ATS may
be inappropriate (or unrealistic) for countries negotiating a treaty for the Arctic.
Another problem with relying too heavily on ATS is that its provisions
have the character of temporary fixes rather than permanent solutions. Instead
163

Seven countries had advanced claims to Antarctica by 1959. In 1908, Great Britain became the
first country to claim sovereignty over a portion of the continent. New Zealand (1923), France
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As discussed in Sections I.C.1 above, the Artic is important for navigation because it offers the
shortest route between the United States and Russia. The Northwest Passage is also likely to
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of arguing about overlapping claims or mining, the countries decided to wait
fifty years. This arrangement certainly made sense at the time, particularly in light
of Cold War concerns and indifference to the mining resources in Antarctica,
but the "wait-and-see" character of the Antarctic Treaty is probably unsuitable
for the Arctic, where, as this Comment has pointed out, countries already seem
disposed to act quickly.
Rather than copy the content of the Antarctic Treaty, I suggest the Arctic
nations copy its structure. There are several advantages to creating a multilateral
agreement specifically governing the Arctic. First, halting the race to claim
sovereignty is probably in the world's best interest. Because UNCLOS is unlikely
to resolve territorial disputes between nations with interests in the North Pole,
Arctic countries are presently motivated to act as quickly as possible. The
international community would probably be better off if Arctic nations were
thoughtful before exploiting polar resources. Additionally, like the Antarctic
Treaty, a multilateral Arctic agreement would not be bound by UN General
Assembly resolutions, so the Arctic nations would be able to exercise significant
control over the treaty. Of course, the countries would be bound by certain UN
Security Council resolutions, 1 ' but those resolutions are unlikely to restrict the
Arctic nations because Russia and the United States both have veto power in the
Security Council.
C. OBJECTS OF AN ARCTIC TREATY
At the very least, a new Arctic Treaty should provide a binding legal
framework for resolving overlapping continental shelf disputes in the Arctic.
Several possible solutions come to mind, including dividing overlapping claims
down the middle (equidistance), using sector theory to divide overlapping claims
based on proximity, and agreeing to binding resolution in an international court
that has experience adjudicating boundary disputes. To the extent that the
countries want to conform to existing legal principles, it would make sense to
articulate a preference for the equidistance principle. As discussed in Section
IV.B.3, the equidistant principle has been the starting point in all three
overlapping continental shelf disputes before the ICJ and is very easy and
inexpensive to apply. Given that UNCLOS exhibits a preference for having
countries resolve disputes themselves, and given the Commission's willingness
to adopt a Norway-Russia compromise in their current dispute, these provisions
should not offend UNCLOS.
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A new Arctic Treaty should also be sure to preserve the navigation,
peaceful purpose, and environmental provisions of UNCLOS.7 2 These
important provisions are unambiguous and should not present any obstacle to
resolving continental shelf disputes. There is neither a compelling reason nor a
legitimate legal opportunity to depart from these key elements of UNCLOS, but
that will probably not create any problems for the countries.
The trickiest part of a new Arctic Treaty would be negotiating mining
provisions without violating UNCLOS. Under the Agreement, seabed mining in
the deep sea may only be done with permission from the Authority." 3 However,
these seabed provisions apply strictly to the deep sea,"7 4 and nations have
exclusive and unrestricted access to seabed mining on their continental
shelves.' The problem is that if the Authority's restrictions are too strict they
will simply encourage countries to pursue continental shelf claims in the hopes
of having exclusive and unrestricted access to the minerals of the seabed. This
perverse incentive could lead to worse environmental outcomes because nations
have large amounts of freedom in carrying out mining
activities on their
7 6
impact.
environmental
of
regardless
continental shelves,
Even though strict seabed restrictions might motivate countries to advance
additional continental shelf claims, and in so doing make the environment
worse, the Authority will probably reject any attempt to privatize the Arctic or to
obtain increased access to the Arctic seabed. In 1984, for example, Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the
United States entered into a multilateral agreement to prevent overlapping deep
seabed mining claims.' The agreement purported to be consistent with
UNCLOS.7 8 Regardless, the Authority rejected the proposal on the grounds that
it was contrary
to the Authority's exclusive power to govern deep seabed mining
activities. iv
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Of course, the Authority may be more willing to agree to Arctic mining
provisions today, provided they include environmental controls. First, the
Authority may rationally seek to avoid the perverse environmental incentive that
strict seabed mining may produce. Second, the Authority may realize the
possibility that Arctic nations could strategically "agree" to each other's
continental shelf claims in order to access seabed minerals and to keep the
profits for themselves rather than sharing them, per the instructions of the
Authority. Though allowing more leeway in the seabed mining provisions in the
Arctic context may feel like a concession of power, it would allow the Authority
to exercise some control over the process. This inclusion may satisfy the
Authority, given that countries can always seek to exclude it by submitting
additional continental shelf claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
Within the last year, international struggle for control of the Arctic's
natural resources, navigational capacity, and military opportunities has
dramatically increased. UNCLOS, the legal regime that should handle territorial
disputes in the Arctic, is likely to be inadequate for determining sovereignty in
the region, particularly in terms of disputes over the continental shelf because
Norway is the only Arctic nation that has agreed to binding resolution of such
disputes. Canada, Russia, and Denmark have all opted out of binding resolution,
and the United States is not a party to UNCLOS.
Though resolution of continental shelf disputes in the Arctic will largely
depend on geology, the world may see polar nations advance creative arguments,
old and new, in order to establish sovereignty. The best way to avoid
unnecessary disputes would be to facilitate a multilateral, Arctic-specific treaty to
resolve some of the problems facing the Arctic. Ideally, an Arctic treaty would
be able to resolve continental shelf disputes quickly and easily in the Arctic,
while maintaining the key elements of UNCLOS's regulation of the water above.
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